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WHO OWNS THE NIGERIAN OFFSHORE SEABED:
FEDERAL OR STATES? AN EXAMINATION OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ABIA STATE & 35 ORS CASE
EDWIN EGEDE*
INTRODUCTION
Nigeria, a nation located on the western coast of Africa with a coastline of
about 853 kilometres,1 has a federal structure of government made up of the
central federal government and 36 states,2 eight of which are located on the
coast [hereinafter referred to as ‘‘littoral states’’].3 Its offshore belts are blessed
with extensive oil and gas ﬁelds, mostly on its continental shelf.4 These off-
shore ﬁelds are presently being explored and exploited through contractual
arrangements between the Nigerian government, through its State Petroleum
Corporation (SPC), the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC),5
and various multinational oil and gas companies.6 Under Nigerian law, the
ownership of natural resources is vested in the federal government.7 However,
the 1999 Constitution8 provides a revenue formula whereby states, with
natural resources being exploited within their territory, are entitled to a
certain percentage of the revenue accruing directly to the federation account
* The author is a doctoral candidate at the Cardiff Law School, Wales, United Kingdom. He
was a legal consultant to the Lagos State Government of Nigeria, one of the parties to the case, on
Law of the Sea issues raised in this case. The views in this article are not intended to represent any
ofﬁcial position of the Lagos State Government. The writer wishes to thank Professor Yemi
Osinbajo, the Attorney General of Lagos State for giving him the opportunity to be consultant
in this novel and interesting case. Also he thanks Professor Robin Churchill, his supervisor, for his
constructive and thought-provoking criticisms of the original draft of this article. Finally he wants
to dedicate this article to his very good friend, Prince Emmanuel, for the invaluable contribution
to this manuscript. Any errors and inaccuracies are however those of the author.
1 See C.I.A.—the World Factbook 2003. http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/
index.html [Accessed 1 February, 2005]. All url references in this article are as at 1 February,
2005 unless otherwise stated.
2 See ss. 2 and 3 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
3 Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross-River, Delta, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo and Rivers.
4 See generally P.C. Underwood, ‘‘Ocean boundaries and resource development in West
Africa’’ in D.M. Johnston and P.M. Saunders (eds.), Ocean Boundary Making: Regional Issues and
Development, London, Croom Helm, 1988, 229–267. Also for map identifying Nigerian offshore oil
wells see http://www.equatorialoil.com/pages/techreview.html
5 See the NNPC Act, Cap. 320, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990.
6 The main natural resource, which generates the bulk of the revenue in the federation
account, is crude oil. As a result of Nigeria’s tremendous natural gas potential, natural gas
is expected in the near future to become a major foreign exchange earner.
7 See s. 44 (3) of the 1999 Constitution and s. 1 (1) of the Minerals and Mining Act No. 34
of 1999.
8 This Constitution came into force on 29 May, 1999 when the military regime of General
Abubakar handed over to the civilian government of President Olusegun Obasanjo. Nigeria has
had a chequered constitutional history replete with military interventions in governance resulting
so far in ﬁve different Constitutions: 1960 (Independence); 1963 (1st Republic); 1979 (2nd
Republic); 1989 (3rd Republic) and 1999 (4th Republic).
from such exploitation. This provision, which is contained in section 162(2) of
the Constitution, provides:
‘‘The President, upon the receipt of advice from the Revenue Mobilisation
Allocation and Fiscal Commission, shall table before the National Assembly
proposals for revenue allocation from the Federation Account, and in determin-
ing the formula, the National Assembly shall take into account, the allocation
principles especially those of population, equality of States, internal revenue
generation, land mass, terrain as well as population density. Provided that the
principle of derivation shall be constantly reﬂected in any approved formula as
being not less than thirteen per cent of the revenue accruing to the Federation
Account directly from any natural resources.’’9
The proviso of this section, which incorporated what is popularly known in
Nigeria as the ‘‘derivation formula’’, brought to the fore the need to determine
(especially as regards revenue derived from the oil and gas resources) whether
the offshore bed of the territorial sea, exclusive economic zone and continental
shelf of Nigeria should be regarded as part of the littoral states or not? The
dispute in this regard culminated in the federal government taking the states
before the Supreme Court and the subsequent landmark decision of the court
on this issue. This article seeks to critically examine the decision of the
Supreme Court as it relates to the ownership of the offshore seabed as between
the federal Government and the littoral states.10 This analysis, in view of the
fact that the natural resources in contention in these zones—oil and gas—are
located in the seabed, shall for the most part be limited to the seabed of these
zones as distinct from the water column.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION V. ATTORNEY GENERAL
OF ABIA STATE & 35 ORS.11
On 6 February, 2001, the federal government of Nigeria through the
Attorney General of the federation and minister of justice ﬁled an action
before a full Court of the Supreme Court of Nigeria12 against the 36 states
of the federation, including the eight littoral states.13 In its ten-paragraph
Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim the federal government called on
the Supreme Court to make the following determination:
‘‘A determination by this Honourable Court of the seaward boundary of a
littoral State within the Federal Republic of Nigeria for the purpose of calculat-
ing the amount of revenue accruing to the Federation Account directly from any
natural resources derived from that State pursuant to the proviso to section
162(2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999.’’
9 See K. Ebeku, ‘‘Nigerian Supreme Court and ownership of offshore oil’’, (2003) 27 Natural
Resources Forum 291–299, for an analysis of the historical setting of the derivation principle.
10 The case also decided certain other issues, e.g. payment of derivation on agricultural
products, funding of primary school education, allocation of revenue to Federal Capital Territory,
Non-payment of Capital Gains Tax and Stamp Duties, Funding of the Judiciary, Joint Venture
Calls and NNPC projects and External Debt Servicing.
11 [2002] 6 N.W.L.R. (part 764), 542.
12 This was done under s. 239, which confers original jurisdiction on the otherwise appellate
Supreme Court over disputes between the Federal Government and States and between States
inter se, and s. 234, which requires a full panel of seven judges to deal with constitutional matters,
of the 1999 Constitution.
13 Filed as Suit No. SC. 28/2001.
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While on its face the determination sought by the federal government
appears to be restricted to merely resolving the seaward boundary of the
littoral states, a careful reading of the statement of claim, where in certain
paragraphs the federal government averred that natural resources located
within the offshore bed and the federal capital territory should be deemed to
be derived from the federation and not any state,14 the actual dispute was as
to the ownership of such offshore bed as between the littoral states and the
federal government.
On 5 April, 2002 the Supreme Court of Nigeria delivered its decision. In its
judgement in this case, a novel point in Nigerian jurisprudence, the Supreme
Court found no concrete help from the Nigerian Territorial Waters Act
(TWA),15 the Exclusive Economic Zone Act (EEZA),16 the Sea Fisheries
Act (SFA),17 or any post-independence legislation.18 Rejecting the attempt
by the counsel to the federal government to rely on the TWA, EEZA and
SFA, to support his arguments on the seaward boundary of the littoral states,
the Chief Justice of Nigeria stated as follows:
‘‘Chief Williams has tried to show this by inference or implication under the
provisions of the Territorial Waters Act, the Sea Fisheries Act and the Exclusive
Economic Zone Act, all of which made reference to the territorial waters of
Nigeria. However, with respect, none of the legislations (sic) expressly deﬁnes
the seaward boundary of the littoral States. This, in my opinion, cannot be
inferred from the legislations (sic).’’19
Neither did the present 1999 Constitution of Nigeria expressly address this
point.20 The Court, faced with a dearth of current legislation on this point,
resorted to certain pre-independence colonial Orders in Council to arrive at
its decision. Also it had to wade through a number of foreign cases dealing
with the issue of ownership of the offshore bed as between the central govern-
ment and the unit states. Eventually the Court, with one voice, though in
some regards there were divergent views, decided that the bed of the territor-
ial sea, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of Nigeria did not form
14 Paras. 8(c), (d), and 9 of the Statement of Claim of the Federal Government ﬁled on
6 February, 2001. Despite these provisions of the Plaintiff ’s Statement of Claim, the Supreme
Court, after stating that the principle of derivation did not apply to the Federal Government,
observed somewhat contrary to the Plaintiff ’s case as contained in its claim that, ‘‘ . . .what the
Plaintiff appears to be saying is that whatever remains in the Federation account after the
application of the principle of derivation, is for distribution among beneﬁciaries listed in subsec-
tion (3) of section 162 [the Federal Government, the State Governments and the Local Govern-
ments] and in accordance with the formula approved by the National Assembly.’’ See OGUNDARE,
J.S.C., above, n. 11, at 653.
15 Cap. 428, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990, as amended by Territorial Waters
(Amendment) Act No. 1 of 1998. The effect of this amendment was to reduce the breadth of
Nigeria’s territorial sea from 30 nautical miles to 12 nautical miles. See generally Edwin Egede,
‘‘The New Territorial Waters (Amendment) Act, 1998—comments on the impact of international
law on Nigerian law’’, (2000) 12 African Journal of International and Comparative Law 84–104.
16 Cap. 116, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990.
17 Cap. 404, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990.
18 Nigeria gained its independence from Britain on 1 October, 1960.
19 UWAIS, C.J.N., above, n. 11, at 721–722. However some of the Justices, IGUH andOGWUEGBU,
J.J.S.C., were of the view that though these pieces of legislation did not expressly deal with the
issue they were useful in deducing such by inference or implication. See n. 96 below.
20 The 1960 Constitution of Nigeria in s. 134(6) dealing with revenue allocation provided, ‘‘For
the purposes of this section the continental shelf of a Region shall be deemed to be part of that
Region.’’ This Constitution is defunct and no similar provision is contained in the current
Constitution.
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part of the littoral states but rather ‘‘belonged’’21 to the federal government.
The decision of the court on this point appeared to have been predicated,
mainly, on the following:
 That the boundaries of the littoral states ended at the low-water mark by
virtue of certain colonial Orders in Council, which in the opinion of the
Court were still valid laws, limiting such boundaries to the ‘‘sea’’;22
 That by virtue of its nature, these offshore zones are not part of the
territory of Nigeria, but rather extra-territorial terrain conceded to
Nigeria by international law;23
 That since international responsibility may arise from such offshore zones
and the Constitution of Nigeria confers on the federal government the
duty of handling external affairs, such offshore zones cannot be regarded
as part of the littoral states of Nigeria;24
 That the extensive control and management, inclusive of the powers to
make laws, conferred by the TWA, EEZA and the SFA on the federal
government raised the inference that ownership of such zones could not
be vested in the littoral states.25
In arriving at its decision against the littoral states’ ownership of the
Nigerian offshore zones, the Court relied heavily on certain decisions of the
English, Australian, Canadian and American Courts.26 Each of the above
four propositions will now be critically examined in turn.
Colonial Orders in Council
The Supreme Court relied on certain colonial Orders in Council enacted
between 1913 and 1954.27 It is extraordinary that the Court was of the view
that these Orders had not become defunct, though not expressly repealed,
after over forty years of Nigeria’s independence and chequered constitutional
history.28
The Orders relied upon by the Court are the Colony of Nigeria (Bound-
aries) Order in Council 1913; the Nigeria Protectorate Order in Council 1922;
the Lagos Local Government (Delimitation of the Town and Division into
Wards) Order in Council 1950; the 1951 Nigeria (Constitution) Order in
Council, No. 1172 and the Northern Region, Western and Eastern Region
(Deﬁnition of Boundaries) Proclamation 1954 made under the 1951 Order in
Council. The most important of these Orders in Council appears to be the
21 To the extent permitted by international law. The Court made extensive reference to the
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 21 ILM 1245 (1982), which Nigeria
ratiﬁed on 14 August, 1986.
22 See A-G of the Federation v. A-G of Abia & Ors,above, OGUNDARE, J.S.C. (lead judgement), at
642–643 and 648; UWAIS, C.J.N., at 726–728; WALI, J.S.C., at 771; KUTIGI, J.S.C., at 792–795;
OGWUEGBU, at 823; ONU, J.S.C., at 860 and IGUH, J.S.C., at 892–893.
23 Ibid., OGUNDARE, J.S.C., at 647–653; UWAIS, C.J.N., at 729–731; WALI, J.S.C., at 771–772.
24 See, ibid., OGWUEGBU, J.S.C., at 828–829 and ONU, J.S.C., at 856–857.
25 Ibid., IGUH, J.S.C., at 889–892 and ONU, J.S.C., at 854–856.
26 Ibid., per OGUNDARE, J.S.C., at 646–647; UWAIS, C.J.N., at 722; per OGWUEGBU, J.S.C., at
828–829; per ONU, J.S.C. at 857 and IGUH, J.S.C., at 892.
27 See, for example, UWAIS, C.J.N., above, n. 11, at 725, who argued that because the 1979 and
1999 Constitutions did not anywhere repeal the deﬁnition of the boundaries contained in the
colonial legislation these Orders in Council were still valid.
28 See n. 8 above.
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1951 Order, which introduced into Nigeria a federal system of government.29
These Orders in Council put the boundary of the various regions out of which
the present littoral states in Nigeria emerged as the ‘‘sea’’ (the Atlantic
Ocean). The justices of the Supreme Court then argued that as these Orders
in Council limited the boundaries of the present littoral states to the ‘‘sea’’,
they therefore precluded the extension of such boundary beyond the low-
water mark. In the words of OGUNDARE, J.S.C., who read the lead judgement,
‘‘One thing, however, is clear. If the boundary is with the sea, then, by logical
reasoning, the sea cannot be part of the territory of any of the old Regions [out
of which the littoral states emerged].’’30 The Chief Justice of Nigeria, for his
part, to buttress this point took the deﬁnition of ‘‘sea’’ in the Concise Oxford
Dictionary, as ‘‘expanse of salt water that covers most of earth’s surface and
encloses its continents and islands, the ocean, any part of this as opposed to
dry land or fresh water’’, and argued that the sea could not possibly be part of
the littoral states.31 It must be pointed out that the Orders in Council did not
anywhere deﬁne the word ‘‘sea’’. Neither does anything suggest on its face
that the ‘‘sea’’ as used in the legislation is synonymous with the low-water
mark,32 as distinct from the high-water mark or even to the outer limit of the
territorial sea, the latter making a distinction between the landwater waters
(the territorial sea) and the seaward waters (the high seas).
Further the resort to the dictionary deﬁnition of the word ‘‘sea’’, in my
opinion, does not provide much assistance, as it is restricted to only the water
column. It does not in itself clarify whether the legislature at that time
intended the offshore seabed and subsoil within national jurisdiction, where
exploration and exploitation is done for the main revenue yielding resources
(crude oil and gas) in contention, to be included as part of the ‘‘sea’’ or part of
the ‘‘land’’. Perhaps an examination of certain historical evidence would give
an indication of the intention of the then British colonial government as
regards the offshore seabed vis-a`-vis the land territory. It is suggested that
the relevant period to determine this intention is the period between 1951 and
1954, when the Nigeria (Constitution) Order in Council introducing a federal
system of government and the Northern Region, Western and Eastern Region
(Deﬁnition of Boundaries) Proclamation made thereunder were promul-
gated.33 Such historical evidence, in my view, would provide a good guide
as to whether the colonial government, acting on behalf of the United
Kingdom, intended the offshore seabed adjacent to Nigeria to be part of the
sea or part of the land territory.
A good point at which to start is to examine the position taken before the
International Law Commission by the United Kingdom during this period on
the offshore seabed vis-a`-vis land territory. Before the Commission the govern-
ment of the United Kingdom appears to have endorsed the view of Sir Cecil
Hurst, on the seabed of the territorial sea, that there could be exclusive
29 See OGUNDARE, J.S.C., at 642–643 and UWAIS, C.J.N., at 726–728, above, n. 11.
30 Above, n. 11, at 643. See also n. 2 above.
31 See UWAIS, C.J.N., above, n. 11, at 728.
32 See E.I. Nwogugu, ‘‘Problems of Nigeria’s international offshore jurisdiction’’, (1973) 23
I.C.L.Q. 349 at 352.
33 In Emelogu v. the State [1988] 2 N.W.L.R. 524 at 557, a learned Justice of the Supreme Court
emphasized the importance of putting a legislation in its proper historical background in order
‘‘to correctly comprehend the true import’’ of the legislation.
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ownership of this portion of the seabed.34 Further, commenting on the Report
of the International Law Commission on its Draft Articles on the High Seas,
the United Kingdom, in respect of the continental shelf, said as follows:
‘‘ . . . the rights of a coastal State over the continental shelf are of the same nature
as its rights over its land territory.’’
‘‘Her Majesty’s Government agree that it is for the time being impracticable to
develop submarine areas internationally; that the continental shelf is not res
nullius; and that the right to exercise sovereignty over the continental shelf is
independent of the concept of occupation.’’35
These statements appear to suggest that at the relevant time the then
British colonial Government was of the view that the coastal state had
sovereignty over the offshore seabed and subsoil of the continental shelf, and
also that the rights it exercised over the continental shelf were of the same
nature as those over its land territory. It is contended, in light of this, that the
intention of the legislature at the time was not that these offshore seabeds
should be part of the sea, but rather be appurtenant to the land territory of
Nigeria. On 8 August, 1957 the Colonial Ofﬁce notiﬁed the Governor-
General of Nigeria of this inherent rights theory, by which the offshore seabed
and subsoil was automatically deemed to be part of the land territory. In this
notiﬁcation it was said ‘‘it is now fairly settled law that the shelf adjacent to
any territory is appurtenant to it in much the same way that territorial waters
are.’’36 Subsequent historical evidence in the form of another notiﬁcation by
the Colonial Ofﬁce of 10 March, 1959 to the Governor-General of Nigeria
suggests a change of position, at least in respect of the continental shelf. In this
notiﬁcation it was said that: ‘‘The Foreign Ofﬁce have concluded that the
wording of Article 2(1) of the Convention on the Continental Shelf precludes
incorporation of the shelf adjacent to Nigeria within the boundaries of
Nigeria.’’37 The question therefore would be: what is the critical date for
determining the relevant intention for the purposes of interpreting the 1951
Order in Council and the 1954 Proclamation? In my view, the critical date
should be pre-1959, where the relevant intention can be inferred from the
comments of the United Kingdom, the colonial State, before the Interna-
tional Law Commission and the 1957 notiﬁcation, rather than the 1959
notiﬁcation. Even so, in 1959 the then Federal Parliament of Nigeria enacted
the Minerals Oils (Amendment) Act where for the purposes of the Act ‘‘land’’
was deﬁned as including both the territorial waters and the seabed and subsoil
of the continental shelf,38 thereby suggesting that land in Nigeria includes
both land on the landward and seaward side of the low-water mark.
34 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1953, vol. II, New York, United Nations,
1959, at 267–268, and C. Hurst, ‘‘Whose is the bed of the sea?’’ (1923–24) IV B.Y.I.L. 34–43.
35 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, ibid., 266–267. See also G. Marston, ‘‘The
extension of the maritime boundaries of certain British colonies under the Colonial Boundaries
Act, 1895: a special case?’’ in Carl Grundy-Warr (ed.), International Boundaries and Boundary Conﬂict
Resolution—Proceedings of the 1989 IBRU Conference,University of Durham, U.K., Durham, Bound-
aries Research Press, 1990, 255.
36 See G. Marston, ‘‘The incorporation of continental shelf rights into United Kingdom law’’,
(1996) 45 I.C.L.Q. 13, at 21–22. See the Grisbadarna Case (Norway v. Sweden), Scott (1909),
Hague Court Reports 121 at 127, which describes the territorial waters as an ‘‘inseparable
appurtenance’’ of the land territory.
37 Marston, ibid., at 27.
38 S. 2 of Act No. 9 of 1959.
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The more recent Petroleum Act39 also seems to incorporate the offshore bed
as part of the land and not the sea. After vesting ownership of petroleum in the
federal government,40 it goes on to state that this ‘‘applies to all land (includ-
ing land covered by water) which (a) is in Nigeria, or (b) is under the
territorial waters of Nigeria, or (c) forms part of the continental shelf, or
(d) forms part of the Exclusive Economic Zone of Nigeria’’. A ﬁrst glance at
this provision might give the impression of a distinction between land in
Nigeria and the territorial sea, continental shelf and the EEZ, thus indicating
an intention to exclude the latter as part of Nigeria. However the reference to
‘‘all lands (including land covered by water)’’, indicates that the distinction is
a matter of form to differentiate between two types of land in Nigeria, namely
non-submerged and submerged land.
All in all, it appears that at worst these Orders in Council referred to by the
Court are irrelevant, or at best they are rather ambiguous. The reliance of the
Court on those pieces of legislation to support its decision is not convincing. It
does appear that the Court in its bid to locate municipal legislation as a
fallback over-stretched the meaning of the word ‘‘sea’’ to be synonymous with
the ‘‘low-water mark’’.
Nature of offshore seabed and subsoil within Nigeria’s national
jurisdiction
After examining the provisions of the 1982 United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (LOSC), including articles 2, 3, 55, 57, 76, 77 and 78, the
Court came to the conclusion that the offshore maritime zones within the
national jurisdiction of Nigeria were not part of the territory of Nigeria but
some kind of extra-territorial terrain which international law conceded to
Nigeria to exercise certain jurisdictional rights.41 OGUNDARE, J.S.C., in his
lead judgement put it as follows:
‘‘The sum total of all I have been saying above is that none of the Territorial
Waters Act, Sea Fisheries Act and Exclusive Economic Zone Act has extended
the land territory of Nigeria beyond its constitutional limit, although the Acts
give municipal effect to international treaties entered into by Nigeria by virtue
of its membership, as a sovereign State, of the Comity of Nations. These treaties
confer sovereignty and other rights on Nigeria over certain areas of the sea (the
Atlantic Ocean).’’42
The court was heavily inﬂuenced by the decision of BARWICK, C.J., in New
South Wales & Ors. v. The Commonwealth,43 who said:
‘‘ . . . the international concession was not that the territory of the nation, in a
proprietary or physical sense, was enlarged to include the area of water in the
territorial sea or the area of subjacent soil. Indeed, the very description ‘territor-
ial waters’ emphasises, in my opinion, that they are waters which wash the
shores of the territory of the nation state, otherwise regarded as ending at the
margin of the land.’’44
39 See also s. 1 of the Petroleum Act, Cap. 350, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990.
40 See n. 7 above on ownership of mineral resources in Nigeria.
41 See above, n. 11: OGUNDARE, J.S.C., at 647–651; UWAIS, C.J.N., at 729–731.
42 Above, n. 11, at 652. See also decision of UWAIS, C.J.N., ibid., at 731.
43 (1975–76) 135 C.L.R. 337 at 363.
44 Ibid. quoted by OGUNDARE, J.S.C., above, n. 11, at 652.
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Territorial sea
The Supreme Court, in arriving at the decision that the territorial sea was
not part of Nigeria did not address itself to the fact that there is historical
evidence to show that even as far back as the nineteenth century certain states
have claimed part of the territorial sea as part of their territory.45 Under
international law the coastal state is granted sovereignty over the territorial
sea.46 In Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States47 the United States Supreme
Court pointed out that ownership of submerged lands is an essential attribute
of sovereignty.48 This raises the issue of whether the fact that international
law, both customary and treaty, confers upon the coastal state sovereignty of
the territorial sea implies ownership of such? The Nigerian Court did not
appear to have adequately addressed this interesting (and very relevant)
jurisprudential issue of the relationship between sovereignty and ownership.49
The attempt by certain counsel to the show littoral states ownership,
through afﬁdavit evidence pointing to historical claim of certain parts of the
sea by communities indigenous to such states, was rejected by the Court as
being ‘‘against the grain of statutory instruments (Orders in Council) and the
common law and international law’’.50 This issue of indigenous community
ownership of parts of the sea was however examined in the more recent New
Zealand case of Ngati Apa, Ngati Koata & Ors. v. Ki Te Tau Ihu Trust & Ors.51
In this case the Court of Appeal, looking at the issue of sovereignty and
ownership of the offshore seabed, embarked on an interesting jurisprudential
excursion of distinguishing between territorial sovereignty vested in the
Crown (imperium) in respect of the foreshore and seabed of the territorial
sea and the right of ownership of such (dominium). The Court then went on
to emphasize the possibility of imperium being vested in the Crown in respect
of such offshore zones while dominium may be vested in someone else. In this
case certain Maori native groups, the Ngati Apa, Ngati Koata, Ngati Kuia,
Ngati Rarua, Ngati Tama, Ngati Toa, Rangitane and Te Atiawa, applied to
45 See P. Jessup, The Law of Territorial Waters and Maritime Jurisdiction, New York, Kraus
Reprint, 1970, 115–119; Hurst, above, n. 34, and V. Prescott and S. Davis, ‘‘Aboriginal claims
to seas in Australia’’, (2002) 17(1) International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 1–31.
46 Art. 2(1) of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 21 ILM 1245
(1982), states that ‘‘The Sovereignty of a coastal State extends beyond its land territory and
internal waters and, in the case of an archipelagic State, its archipelagic waters, to an adjacent
belt of sea described as the territorial sea.’’ Art. 2 (2) extends such sovereignty to the airspace and
bed and subsoil of the territorial sea. See also art. 2 of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea
and Contiguous Zone. In the Grisbadarna Case (1909) Hague Reports, 121 at 127, the Perma-
nent Court of Arbitration held that when territory was ceded to Sweden: ‘the radius of maritime
territory constituting an inseparable appurtenance of this land territory must have automatically
formed a part of this cession.’ See also Judge Sir Arnold McNair’s dissenting judgement in the
Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case ICJ Reports (1951) 116 at 160 and G. Marston, ‘‘The evolution
of the concept of sovereignty over the bed and subsoil of the territorial sea’’ (1976–1977) XLVIII
B.Y.I.L. 321–332.
47 482 U.S. 193 at 195 (1987).
48 See also United States v. Texas,339 U.S.707 at 717 (1950).
49 See on this D.P. O’Connell, ‘‘The juridical nature of the territorial sea’’, (1971) 45 B.Y.I.L
.304–383 and Marston, above, n. 46.
50 Above, n. 11, per OGUNDARE, J.S.C., at 652–653 and UWAIS, C.J.N. at 722–724.
51 [2003] NZCA 117 (19 June, 2003). For an examination of this case when it initially came up
before the Maori Land Court see J.S. Davidson, ‘‘New Zealand: ownership of the foreshore and
sea-bed’’, (1998) 13(4) International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 617–622. Also see Australian
case of Mabo v. Queensland [No. 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1.
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the Maori Land Court for declaratory orders that certain land below the
mean high-water mark in the Marlborough Sounds were Maori customary
lands. The Attorney General and certain non-Maori parties ﬁled preliminary
objections to the effect that such applications could not succeed as a matter of
law, since lands falling under the foreshore and territorial sea of New Zealand
were, under common law and certain legislation,52 vested in the Crown. The
Court of Appeal was of the view that the mere fact that the foreshore and the
bed of the territorial sea were vested in the Crown did not in itself exclude
Maori ownership of such offshore lands under native law and custom. As far
as the Court was concerned, though the Crown had imperium over such
offshore lands by reason of sovereignty this did not in itself exclude the
dominion of the Maoris over such land if there was evidentiary proof, to be
laid before the Maori Land Court, proving such native rights. The Court
held that conferring sovereignty of such offshore zones on the Crown under
common law will only apply subject to local custom, including property
rights. Also, the Court was of the view that legislation vesting such offshore
zones in the Crown, since it had no express expropriatory purpose, could only
be read as vesting such on the Crown subject to the preservation of existing
property interests, including Maori property rights, if satisfactorily estab-
lished by evidence.
Nigeria, like New Zealand, as a former British territory with native popula-
tion, also received the common law subject to local custom, including prop-
erty rights.53 The New Zealand Court of Appeal, in arriving at its decision,
quoted extensively and relied heavily on the Privy Council case of Amodu
Tijani v. Secretary, Southern Nigeria.54 Here the Privy Council made it clear that
though Lagos and the territory round it had been ceded to the British Crown,
this sovereign right of the Crown did not in itself extinguish the ownership
rights under native law and custom.55 In arriving at this decision, the Privy
Council issued a warning about the tendency of trying to understand the type
of title under native law and custom by trying to equate it with concepts
familiar only in English law.56 Accordingly, the Privy Council felt constrained
to point out that: ‘‘As a rule, in the various systems of native jurisprudence
throughout the Empire, there is no such full division between property and
possession as English lawyers are familiar with.’’57
Unfortunately the Nigerian Supreme Court, because it relied on ambigu-
ous Orders in Council, and also because of its reliance on the purported
enunciation of the common law by the case of R v. Keyn, did not critically
evaluate the evidence tendered by certain littoral states. These states,
52 Such as the New Zealand Territorial Sea and Fishing Zone Act, 1965 and the Territorial
Sea, Contiguous Zone and Exclusive Economic Zone Act, 1977; Foreshore and Seabed Endow-
ment Revesting Act, 1991; Resource Management Act, 1991 and the Harbours Acts 1878
and 1950.
53 See Laoye & Ors v. Oyetunde [1944] A.C. 170 at 172–173, where Lord Wright stated: ‘‘The
policy of the British Government . . . is to use for purposes of the administration of the country
[Nigeria] the native laws and customs in so far as possible and in so far as they have not been
varied or suspended by statutes or ordinances affecting Nigeria. The courts which have been
established by the British Government have the duty of enforcing these native laws and customs,
so far as they are not barbarous, as part of the law of the land.’’
54 [1921] 2 AC 399.
55 Ibid., at 404.
56 Ibid., at 402–403.
57 Ibid.
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especially Cross Rivers and Lagos states, gave evidence through their plead-
ings and afﬁdavit evidence in support of their attempt to establish ownership
under native law and custom over these offshore zones by certain communities
indigenous to these states. As far as UWAIS, C.J.N., was concerned, though the
evidence adduced was useful it did not help in answering the question of the
seaward boundaries of these states.58 Without the beneﬁt of a critical evalua-
tion and deﬁnite pronouncement on such evidence by the Nigerian Court, it is
difﬁcult to say whether or not such evidence conclusively established any
customary ownership by the indigenous communities over such offshore
zones.59 An examination of such evidence was essential, for if such customary
ownership of these offshore zones had been established it behoved the
Nigerian Court to apply the common law subject to this customary right of
ownership. If such customary rights of ownership are established to have
existed, by virtue of the Nigerian Land Use Act, these rights have since
197860 become vested in the governor of the state in which such indigenous
communities are situated. This raises the possibility that such offshore zones
are vested through this means on littoral states able to prove such ownership
under native law and custom.
Continental shelf and EEZ
As regards the offshore bed of the continental shelf of Nigeria, which over-
laps with the EEZ, in so far as it does not extend beyond 200 nautical miles,61
the Court, while referring to the provisions of articles 76–78 of the LOSC,
appears to have glossed over the nature of the continental shelf under inter-
national law.62 Considering the novelty of a case such as this before the Court,
it would have been expected that in reaching its decision on the continental
shelf vis-a`-vis Nigeria, the Court would have examined the historical develop-
ment of the concept of the continental shelf from the Truman Proclamation,63
along with the numerous decisions of the ICJ on this, especially the 1969
decision of the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases.64 Though these decisions
58 See n. 11, above, at 723–724.
59 See Prescott and Davis, above, n. 45, at 16–18, where the writers suggested that such
evidence should include detailed knowledge of current and past members of the clan about
reefs, rocks, channels, currents and tides as well as precise knowledge about seasonal variations
that occur in the type, quantity and amount of food that can be obtained from the sea.
60 S. 1 of the Land Use Act, Cap. 202, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990 states that
‘‘subject to the provisions of this Act, all land comprised in the territory of each State in the
Federation is hereby vested in the Governor of that State and such land shall be held in trust and
administered for the use and common beneﬁt of all Nigerians in accordance with the provisions of
this Act.’’
61 See the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta) Case, ICJ Reports (1984), 3,
paras. 33 and 34. While the EEZ goes beyond the seabed aspects to include the water column
resources and issues, this article shall not give prominence to the latter because the central focus of
the dispute before the court was in respect of revenue from oil and gas resources located in the
offshore seabed of Nigeria.
62 Above, per OGUNDARE, J.S.C., at 655–656. See the interesting analysis on the basis of a
coastal States’ title to these offshore seabeds in M. Evans, Relevant Circumstances and Maritime
Delimitation, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989, 44–62 and P.A. Symonds et al.,‘‘Characteristics of
continental margins’’ in P.J. Cook and C.M. Carleton (eds.), Continental Shelf Limits: The Scientiﬁc
and Legal Interface, Oxford, 2000, 25–63.
63 For the text of the Truman Proclamation of 28 September, 1945 see (1946)
40 A.J.I.L., suppl., 45–48.
64 I.C.J. Reports (1969), 3.
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applied to disputes between nation states in the international sphere and not
disputes between component units of a federal state, it would have been
helpful if these decisions had been considered and applied by the Nigerian
court in determining the exact nature of the continental shelf vis-a`-vis Nigeria
as a nation state. This would have guided the Court in its interpretation of the
Nigerian constitution and domestic legislation to ascertain as between the
federal government and littoral states who owns the Nigerian continental
shelf. The decision of the Supreme Court appears to reveal a court that was
not eager to embark on detailed analysis of the nature of the continental shelf
under international law. The Court merely restricted itself to a rather cursory
reference to treaty provisions, especially the United Convention on the Law of
the Sea, without necessarily examining decisions of international courts on the
nature of the continental shelf. This in itself could be said to be symptomatic
of the fact that in respect of international law the Court appeared to be on
very tenuous grounds.65 Perhaps this can be explained away in the sense that
Nigerian judges, like most common law jurisdictions, generally do not have a
culture of international law as was pointed out by Judge Rosalyn Higgins
when she said:
‘‘ . . . there is another culture that exists, in which it is possible to become a
practising lawyer without having studied international law, and indeed to
become a judge knowing no international law. Psychologically that disposes
both counsel and judges to treat international law as some exotic branch of law,
to be avoided if at all possible, and to be looked upon as if it is unreal, of no
practical application in the real world.’’66
However perhaps the shortcoming in this regard of the Supreme Court,
made up of many eminent jurists, can be attributed to a shortage of resources,
not least research assistants.67
Since the Truman Proclamation, the basis of a coastal State’s title to the
continental shelf has been the natural prolongation principle. This has been
emphasized in various decisions of the international courts.68 In the North Sea
Continental Shelf Cases69 the Court explained that: ‘‘The continental shelf is, by
deﬁnition, an area physically extending the territory of most coastal states into
65 There were some glaring errors in the statements of some of the justices in respect of
international law, e.g. of such statements are per OGUNDARE, J.S.C., at 651: ‘‘By the 1958
Convention the breadth of the territorial sea is a maximum of 3 miles.’’ Per UWAIS, C.J.N., at
731: ‘‘It is noted that the 3 nautical miles mentioned in the case were later extended to 12 nautical
miles by the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, which
preceded the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.’’ It is trite under interna-
tional law that the issue of the breadth of the territorial sea, one of the major issues that led to the
convening of UNCLOS III, was not dealt with by the Geneva Convention but rather by the 1982
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. See R. Churchill and V. Lowe, The Law of the
Sea, Manchester, 1999, 77–81.
66 R. Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It, Oxford, 1994, 206.
67 There is no provision for research assistants for the Judges under the Supreme Court Rules so
they do all their research themselves. This puts intense pressure on this rather overworked court
having, in addition to its original jurisdiction, extensive appellate jurisdiction to hear and
determine appeals from the Court of Appeal emanating from all parts of the country.
68 See, e.g., the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, n. 64, above; arbitration between the UK and
France UNRIAA Vol. XVIII(1977), 49 at para. 79 and 92 at para. 194; the Continental Shelf
(Tunisia/Libya) Case, ICJ Reports(1982), 18; Continental Shelf (Libya/Malta) Case, ICJ
Reports (1985), 13.
69 Ibid.
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a species of platform which has attracted the attention ﬁrst of geographers and
hydrographers and then of jurists.’’70
The Court in this case went on to state:
‘‘ . . .The rights of the coastal State in respect of the area of continental shelf that
constitutes a natural prolongation of its land territory into and under the sea
exist ipso facto and ab initio, by virtue of its sovereignty over the land, and as an
extension of it in an exercise of sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring the
seabed and exploiting its resources.’’71
In addition, the Court, emphasizing the basis of the rights of the coastal state
over the continental shelf, points out that:
‘‘What confers the ipso jure title which international law attributes to the coastal
State in respect of its continental shelf, is the fact that the submarine areas
concerned may be deemed to be actually part of the territory over which the
coastal State already has dominion—in the sense that, although covered with
water, they are a prolongation or continuation of that territory, an extension of
it under the sea.’’ 72
The decision in theNorth Sea Continental Shelf Cases has since been supported
by subsequent decisions of the International Court of Justice including the
Tunisia/Libya Case.73 The Court in this case emphasized that the natural
prolongation principle was not only part of customary international law but
had been incorporated into article 76 of the then draft Law of the Sea
Convention, which was eventually retained as the same article 76 in the ﬁnal
draft of the Convention.74
While article 76(1) of the UNCLOS 82 now places an emphasis on dis-
tance, it does not detract from the continental shelf being a natural prolonga-
tion of the land territory of the coastal State. Article 76(1) states:
‘‘The Continental Shelf of a coastal State comprises the sea-bed and subsoil of the submarine
areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land
territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical
miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured
where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that
distance.’’ (italics mine for emphasis)
The effect of the decisions of the international courts is that the continental
shelf, to the extent limited by international law,75 is to be regarded as part of
the coastal state by reason of its contiguity to the landmass. Certain African
States, in line with the natural elongation principle, have enacted legislation
to the effect that the continental shelf will be regarded as part of their
territory, at least for certain limited purposes, including mining and customs
and excise. For example, the Namibian Territorial Sea and Exclusive
Economic Zone Act states that,
‘‘The continental shelf referred to in subsection (1) shall be regarded as part of
Namibia and shall for the purposes of (a) the exploitation of the natural
resources of the sea; and (b) any provision of any law relating to mining,
70 Ibid., 51 at para. 95.
71 Ibid., 22 at para. 19.
72 Ibid., 31 at para. 43.
73 Above, n. 68.
74 Above. n. 68, 46–47 at paras. 43 and 45.
75 Art. 77 of LOSC.
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precious stones, metals or minerals, including natural oil, which applies in that
part of Namibia which adjoins the continental shelf, be deemed to be State
land.’’76
In the recent South African case of De Beers Marine (PTY) Ltd. v. The
Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service,77 it was held that the con-
tinental shelf as deﬁned by the Maritime Zones Act78 shall be deemed to be
part of the Republic of South Africa for the purposes of Customs and Excise.79
The Nigerian Court throughout its entire examination of the continental
shelf appears not to have considered the idea of it being a natural prolonga-
tion of the land territory of Nigeria. If the continental shelf is a natural
prolongation of the land territory of Nigeria, the issue is who owns it? This
is to be determined by the domestic laws of Nigeria, some of which will be
examined in the subsequent section.
Municipal laws of Nigeria
The most compelling factor in determining whether the ‘‘ownership’’ of the
territorial sea, continental shelf and EEZ of Nigeria is vested in the federal
government or the littoral states is the municipal law of Nigeria. Unfortu-
nately the municipal law failed to expressly deal with this issue.
The 1999 Constitution
The 1999 Constitution is the supreme law of Nigeria; any law that is
inconsistent with its provisions is to the extent of such inconsistency null and
void.80 There are no express provisions on the ownership of the offshore
seabed as between the federal government and the littoral states under the
Constitution. However, is such ownership implicit in the Constitution? The
Constitution declares Nigeria to be a federation consisting of states and a
federal capital territory (FCT). The FCT is the only territory vested in the
federal government under the Constitution.81 While the FCT is clearly
deﬁned by the Constitution in terms of precise co-ordinates,82 the extent of
the various states are merely deﬁned by mentioning the local governments
areas in each state in the federation without any exact delimitation of such.83
The counsel for the littoral states argued strenuously that since the offshore
bed within Nigerian national jurisdiction does not fall within the precise
constitutional deﬁnition of the FCT, it should be taken to be part of the local
government areas, which are not deﬁned with precision, of the abutting
littoral states.84 The court, however, too readily dismissed the arguments of
counsel for the littoral states, in this regard, on erroneous grounds, including
the contention of one of the judges that a local government cannot exist on the
76 S. 6 (2) of Act No. 3 of 30 June, 1990.
77 The Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa, Case no. 165/2001, Judgement delivered on
the 20 May, 2002. See http://wwwserver.law.wits.ac.za/sca/ﬁles/16501/16501.pdf
78 Act No. 15 of 1994.
79 S. 5(b) of the Customs and Excise Act No. 92 of 1964.
80 S. 1.
81 S. 2(2).
82 Ss. 3(4), 297 and Part II of the First Schedule.
83 Ss. 3(1) and (2) and Part I of the First Schedule.
84 For comprehensive summary of arguments of counsel see UWAIS, C.J.N., above, n. 65, at
699–722.
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sea.85 It is my contention that the Court’s decision was based on its failure to
appreciate the crucial link between a contiguous landmass and the submerged
land under the sea. Also, even if it is conceded that the boundary of the littoral
states ends at the low-water mark, this would necessarily mean that the part of
the sea on the landward of the low-water mark, which is part of internal
waters,86 will be part of one of the local governments, combining with the
others to form the contiguous littoral state. It is my contention that there is
nothing incongruous about the territorial sea and bed of the EEZ and con-
tinental shelf being part of the local government areas contiguous to the sea.
The Constitution, by avoiding precise co-ordinates in describing states and
local government areas, certainly does not preclude the submerged land of the
offshore bed being a part of the local government area adjoining it.87
Another point that appeared to have swayed the Supreme Court against
arguments of counsel for the littoral states was the fact that the previous 1960
and 1963 Nigerian Constitutions had made express provisions deeming the
continental shelf as part of the then regions for revenue derivation purpose,
while the current 1999 Constitution was silent on the question.88 As far as the
Court was concerned, the 1960 and 1963 constitutions only ‘‘deemed’’ that
the continental shelf be part of the units solely for revenue purposes and if this
provision had not existed the revenue derived from exploitation of resources in
this offshore bed would not have been accruable to such regions.89 It is my
contention that the silence of the 1999 constitution does not in itself lead to the
conclusion that littoral states do not have ownership of the continental shelf.
Implicitly, the 1999 Constitution, by limiting the federal territory to a clearly
deﬁned FCT, appears to lean in favour of the littoral states’ ownership of the
offshore bed, including the continental shelf.
The Offshore Oil Revenues (Registration of Grants) Act
The argument that these offshore seabed zones are part of the littoral states
is also supported by implication by the Offshore Oil Revenues (Registration of
Grants) Act.90 This Act states that:
‘‘All registrable instruments relating to any lease, licence, permit or right
issued or granted to any person in respect of the territorial waters and the
continental shelf of Nigeria shall, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in
any enactment continue to be registrable in the States of the Federation,
respectively, which are contiguous to the said territorial waters and the
continental shelf.’’91
In cases where there are disputes as to whether or not any instrument is
registrable in any state, such dispute is required to be determined by the head
of the federal government whose decision shall be ﬁnal and binding.92 This
legislation, which was enacted during the military regime, is still a valid and
85 KUTIGI, J.S.C., above, n. 11, at 791–792.
86 Art. 8 of LOSC 82.
87 S. 3 (1) and First Schedule Part 1 of the 1999 Constitution.
88 OGUNDARE, J.S.C., above, n. 65, at 654–655.
89 See s. 134 of the 1960 and s. 140 of the 1963 Constitutions. Refer to nn. 2 and 20 above.
90 Cap. 336, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990. See UWAIS, C.J.N., above, n. 65, at 714,
for argument of counsel to the 3rd Defendant, Akwa Ibom State, in this regard.
91 S. 1 (1).
92 S. 1(2).
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subsisting law, though the validity of the provision giving the head of the
federal government the right in cases of dispute, presumably between two
contiguous littoral states, to make a ﬁnal and binding decision, is doubtful in
view of the provisions of the Constitution that gives the Supreme Court
original jurisdiction over disputes between states.93
The fact that such registration is to be done in the littoral state contiguous
to such offshore zone rather than the Federal Capital Territory certainly
weighs in favour of these zones being regarded as part of the littoral states
and not federal government territory.
The Territorial Waters Act (TWA), Exclusive Economic Zone Act (EEZA)
and Sea Fisheries Act (SFA)
The TWA (stating the breadth of the territorial sea and making provision
in respect of the exercise by the Nigerian courts of criminal jurisdiction over
the Nigerian territorial sea),94 the EEZA (regulating the Nigerian EEZ) and
the SFA (regulating ﬁshing within Nigerian waters),95 while not making
express provision for ownership of the offshore zones, were utilized by certain
justices of the Supreme Court to rule against littoral states ownership. As far
as IGUH, J.S.C., and ONU, J.S.C.,96 were concerned, the fact that the legisla-
tion had given extensive governmental authority and powers, including the
power to make laws, to the federal government was an indication that own-
ership could not lie with the littoral states. Admittedly, a lot of governmental
authority and control is conferred by the legislation on the federal govern-
ment. For the TWA, the original legislation in 1967 had initially given both
the federal government and the littoral states, then known as regions, con-
current powers to make laws in respect of the territorial waters of Nigeria.97
By 1971, with the amendment of the 1967 legislation, this power to make laws
in respect of the territorial waters became limited to the federal government.98
The EEZA, as amended by the EEZ (Amendment) Act,99 vests the sovereign
and exclusive rights with respect to the exploration and exploitation of the
EEZ in the Federal Republic of Nigeria, such rights to be exercisable by the
federal government.100 It also allows the federal government to establish
artiﬁcial islands and installations for the purpose of exploring and exploiting,
conserving and managing the natural resources in the EEZ.101 Under this Act
the power to prosecute for offences committed in this zone is conferred on the
Federal Attorney General and the jurisdiction to try such offences is conferred
upon the Federal High Court,102 a Court considered to be established by the
federal government, as opposed to the State High Courts, which are Courts of
93 S. 232(1).
94 See E. Egede, ‘‘The Nigerian territorial waters legislation and the Law of the Sea
Convention (LOSC) 1982’’, (2004) 19(2) The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law
147–172.
95 See nn. 14, 15 and 16 above.
96 Above, n. 11, at 889–892 and 854–856 respectively.
97 See s.1 (2) of the Territorial Waters Act, No. 5 of 1967.
98 See para. 2 of the Schedule to the Territorial Waters (Amendment) Act No. 38 of 1971.
99 Act No. 42 of 1998.
100 S. 2(1).
101 S. 3.
102 The Territorial Waters Act merely states ‘‘Nigerian Court’’ without specifying the exact
Court having jurisdiction to try offences committed in the territorial waters of Nigeria. See ss. 2
and 3.
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the states.103 The SFA requires ﬁshing vessels wishing to ﬁsh in the Nigerian
territorial sea and EEZ to be licensed.104 The licensing ofﬁcer is in this Act
deﬁned as the Minister of Agriculture, Water Resources, and Rural Devel-
opment, a minister of the federal government, or any person appointed by
him.105 Undoubtedly, these laws confer upon the federal government exten-
sive powers of control and management of these offshore zones. It is however
doubtful if such can be used to infer federal government ownership of such
zones.106 Such inference is confronted with the challenge of how such federal
government ownership can be placed within the constitutional framework
limiting federal government ownership to a clearly deﬁned FCT, which
obviously does not include offshore zones. As has been argued above, the
attempt by the Court to exclude such zones from being part of Nigeria,
especially the seabed portion, is not convincing.107 Further the authority of
the federal government to make laws in these zones and to exercise control
and management is not based on their ownership of these zones, but rather on
the fact that such issues are placed under the federal government’s legislative
powers under the Exclusive Legislative List of the 1999 constitution.108 Just as
the exclusive powers to legislate over matters in the Exclusive Legislative List
of the Constitution, when exercised over the land territory of a State or any
part thereof, does not make such territory any less the territory of such State
(for instance, the mere fact that the federal government has policing powers
over the land territory of a state does not make the territory any less that of the
state), so too the exclusive powers to legislate over matters in the offshore
zones cannot in itself be a basis to ascribe ownership of such zones to the
federal government. A perusal of the Exclusive Legislative List of the Con-
stitution consisting of 68 items reveals that the Exclusive list does not restricts
the right to legislate on all matters in respect of the territorial sea, continental
shelf and EEZ of Nigeria to only the federal government. The constitution-
ality of the 1971 amendment of the TWA in the light of the 1999 Constitution
is therefore doubtful.109 Though the states cannot legislate in respect of these
offshore zones on, for instance, mines and minerals, maritime shipping and
navigation and defence, which fall under the Exclusive List,110 nothing stops
them from legislating on matters outside this list. For instance, nothing pre-
cludes the littoral states from legislating on antiquities or monuments found in
the offshore bed as long as it can establish that such bed is part of the state.
This is of course subject to the proviso that they are not designated as national
antiquities or monuments.111 This in itself would lead in a rather cyclic
103 Ss. 4 and 5. See ss. 249–254 (Federal High Court) and ss. 270–274 (State High Courts) of
the 1999 Constitution.
104 S. 1.
105 S. 15.
106 The Chief Justice rejected the attempt by counsel for the federal government to raise such
inference. See n. 19 above.
107 See above, ‘‘Nature of offshore seabed and subsoil within Nigeria’s national jurisdiction’’
section of this article.
108 See s. 4(2) and Part I of the Second Schedule of the constitution. There are three legislative
lists: Exclusive (Federal Government only); Concurrent (Federal and States); and Residual
(States only). The constitution speciﬁes matters contained in the Exclusive and Concurrent
Lists while the Residual List, which is not expressly drawn out, are those matters not falling
under the Exclusive and Concurrent Lists. See s. 4 and the Second Schedule of the constitution.
109 See n. 98 above.
110 See paras. 17, 36 and 39.
111 See s. 4 (7) and para. 3 of Part II of the Second Schedule of the Constitution.
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manner to the question before the Court as to whether such offshore bed is
part of the littoral states or not? This points to the futility of using the
extensive legislative, control and management argument as a basis for holding
in favour of federal rather than littoral states’ ownership of the Nigerian
offshore zones.
Foreign cases
The Supreme Court relied heavily, in view of the novel nature of the case,
on certain foreign cases from Britain, America, Australia and Canada.112
While there is nothing wrong with obtaining guidance from foreign cases in
dealing with novel points, it is my view that these cases were either inap-
propriate or distinguishable from the case before the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court relied very heavily, in arriving at its decision, on the
oft-criticized case113 of R v. Keyn,114 a classic example of a case where it is
rather difﬁcult to extricate the ratio decidendi as a result of the number of
judges involved and their divergent opinions.115 From subsequent cases inter-
preting R v. Keyn it is taken to have been decided that under the common law
the territorial sea was not part of the territory of England.116 This interpreta-
tion as regards the ratio decidendi of this case was obviously accepted by the
Supreme Court of Nigeria. Even if it is accepted that this was the position of
the law at the time of the decision in R v. Keyn, it is difﬁcult to accept that it is
still the present position of the law. Customary international law on the
territorial sea, a great part of which was merely codiﬁed by the Law of the
Sea Convention,117 has since the decision of that case clariﬁed that the coastal
State’s sovereignty extends beyond its land territory to the territorial sea.118
Under Nigerian law, while treaties have to be transformed by local legislation
to be enforceable in Nigeria,119 customary international law automatically
applies as an enforceable part of Nigerian laws.120 As SHAW, L.J, in the
112 See R. v. Keyn (1876) 2 Ex.D.63 (British); United States v. Louisiana 394 US 11, 699 (1950);
United States v. State of California 332 US 19 (1947); United States v. State of West Virginia 295 US 463
(American); New South Wales v. Commonwealth 8 ALR (1975–6) 1 (Australian) and Re. Ownership
Offshore Mineral Rights, Vol. 65 DLR 2nd, 354, 1967 (Canadian).
113 See, e.g., O’Connell, above, n. 49, at 304–383; and J. Gibson, ‘‘The ownership of the
sea-bed under British territorial waters’’, VI(2) International Relations (1978) 474–499.
114 (1876) 2 Ex.D 63. For a detailed account of the case including arguments at the hearing, see
G. Marston, The Marginal Seabed: United Kingdom Legal Practice, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1981,
114–151.
115 See O’Connell, above, n. 49, at 328–331 and Marston, ibid., 137.
116 See Marston, above, n. 113, at 192–219; See also Reference Re. Ownership of Off-Shore
Mineral Rights, above, n. 111, at 2027.
117 See Preamble 7 of the LOS Convention 1982, which recognizes that part of the Convention,
is merely codiﬁcation of existing customary international law. Quite a number of the provisions of
the Convention, which initially could be said to be progressive development, could be said to have
crystallized into customary international law as a result of the overwhelming number of States
that have ratiﬁed the Convention: as at 1 February, 2005, 148 States had ratiﬁed the Convention.
See http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_ﬁles/chronological_lists_of_ratiﬁcations.htm. See also
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, and L.T. Lee, ‘‘The Law of the Sea Convention and Third
States’’, (1983) 3 A.J.I.L. 541–568 on how Convention provisions can crystallize into customary
international law.
118 See n. 47 and discourse on territorial sea above.
119 See s. 12(1) of the 1999 Constitution and Abacha v. Fawehinmi [2000] 6 N.W.L.R.
(Part 660), 228.
120 See WALI, J.S.C., in Ibidapo v. Lufthansa Airlines [1997] 4 N.W.L.R. (Part 498) 124 at 150
who points out that Nigeria inherited the English common law rules on the municipal application
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English Court of Appeal case of Trendtex v. Central Bank of Nigeria, rightly
pointed out concerning the courts of England, which is similarly applicable to
the courts of Nigeria, ‘‘What is immutable is the principle of English law that
the law of nations (not what was the law of nations) must be applied in the
courts of England.’’121 Further, the common law position, as pointed out
above, would apply subject to local conditions, including relevant native laws
and custom, including those affecting property rights, to be established by a
preponderance of evidence.122
Most of the judges of the Supreme Court appear to have been impressed
with American, Australian and Canadian cases that preferred the central
government, rather than the component units, as a result of the interna-
tional responsibility argument.123 The argument is to the effect that interna-
tional responsibility may arise from the offshore zones, and since the federal
government, and not the littoral states, is the repository of the function to
carry out external affairs under the Constitution, such offshore zones cannot
be regarded as part of the littoral states.124 A.V. Lowe has rebutted this
contention.125 He points out amongst other things that any international
responsibility is for a nation state as a whole, both central and the component
units, and the fact that the federal government is the competent organ to
handle external affairs is a matter of form.126 He also points out that this
cannot be a basis for deciding against the units in favour of the central
government as regards offshore zones since the nation state acting through
the federal government is no more nor less responsible under international law
for offshore activities than it is for onshore activities.127 Any activity, whether
onshore or offshore, affecting another nation’s interest will bring about inter-
national responsibility. Therefore if this cannot be used as a basis to impute
that the littoral states are any less owners of the onshore lands, it should in the
same vein not be a basis to impute such in respect of offshore lands. The
distinction between the issue of ownership of offshore beds and international
responsibility was recognized by the Australian legislature when it enacted
the Coastal Waters (State Powers) Act, 1980.128 This Act, which purports to
transfer constitutional powers over coastal waters and title to seabed minerals
from the Commonwealth to the states, recognized this distinction by stating
of international law. Under the English common law rules customary international law has
automatic application in the municipal setting. See Buvot v. Babuit (1737) Cases t. Talbot. 281;
Triquet v. Bath (1764) 3 Burr. 1478 and Trendex Trading Corporation v. Central Bank of Nigeria [1977]
Q.B. 529.
121 Ibid. at 578.
122 See n. 48 above and the discourse of the New Zealand case of Ngati Apa & Ors v. Ki Te Tau
Ihu Trust & Ors. Above.
123 See, e.g., OGWUEGBU, J.S.C., above n. 11, at 828–829, and ONU, J.S.C., above at 856–857,
referring to such cases as U.S. v. Louisiana, above; Reference Re. Ownership of Offshore Minerals
Rights, above, and New South Wales & Ors. v. Commonwealth, above, note 111. See in the case of
Australia, s. 6 of the Seas and Submerged Lands Act, 1973, as amended by the Maritime
Legislation Amendment Act, 1994, which clearly vests sovereignty in respect of the territorial
sea, airspace, seabed and subsoil thereof in the Commonwealth.
124 See para. 26 of the Exclusive Legislative List, Second Schedule Part I of the 1999
Constitution.
125 A.V. Lowe, ‘‘International law and Federal offshore lands disputes’’, (1977) Marine Policy
311–317.
126 Ibid. at 312.
127 Ibid. at 313.
128 Act No. 75 of 1980.
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as follows:
‘‘Nothing in this Act affects the status of the territorial sea of Australia under
international law or the rights and duties of the Commonwealth in relation to
ensuring the observance of international law, including the provisions of inter-
national agreements binding on the Commonwealth and, in particular, the
provisions of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone
relating to the right of innocent passage of ships.’’129
Furthermore the decisions of these foreign cases were based upon their
peculiar constitutional history. For example the American cases following
the earliest decision of United States v. California,130 upon a careful perusal
appear to be based largely on the equal footing doctrine.131 This doctrine is
premised on the peculiar constitutional history of America that all states were
admitted into the union on equal footing with the 13 original colonies.
Consequently, since there was no historical support to show that the original
colonies acquired ownership of the territorial sea, all subsequent states could
not be said to have acquired such ownership. Despite the similar presidential
style of government in Nigeria, the American equal footing doctrine, based on
the unique constitutional history of America, does not apply to Nigeria.
Though the Supreme Court of Nigeria examined the constitutional history
of Nigeria by looking at the colonial Orders in Council demarcating the
boundaries of the then regions of Nigeria, the interpretation given to such
Orders by the Court was ﬂawed. In addition, a central common factor that
appears to run through American, Canadian and the Australian constitu-
tional history which greatly inﬂuenced the decisions referred to, is the fact that
the component units were in existence before merging to form a federal system
of government, thereby giving room for the illusion that the component units
by implication surrendered their rights to these offshore zones to the central
government. In the case of Nigeria the situation is different, as both the
federal and component units emerged at the same time with no such implica-
tion of surrender of rights to offshore lands.132 KUTIGI, J.S.C., as a lone voice,
though he eventually arrived at the same conclusion as the other judges in
respect of the ownership of these offshore zones,133 pointed out, and rightly in
my view, that these foreign cases were not exactly relevant to the Nigerian
situation.134
AFTERMATH OF THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME
COURT—A POLITICAL SOLUTION
Immediately after the decision of the Supreme Court, which had far-
reaching adverse ﬁnancial implication for certain littoral states, the federal
government embarked on what it termed a ‘‘political solution’’ to the issue.135
129 S. 6.
130 Above, n. 112.
131 See also The United States v. Louisiana, above; United States v. State of Alaska, 117S.Ct.1888
(1997); Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. (2001).
132 Nwogugu, ‘‘Problems of Nigerian offshore jurisdiction’’, above, n. 32, at 360.
133 He erroneously relied on the Colonial Orders in Council. See author’s argument above.
134 Above, n. 11, at 790–791.
135 By excluding offshore seabed from the ambit of the derivation formula certain littoral States
such as Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Rivers and Ondo State, which have virtually no
onshore oil deposits but mainly offshore, are adversely affected ﬁnancially by the Supreme Court’s
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The federal government appointed a presidential committee under the chair-
manship of the then Works and Housing Minister, Chief Tony Anenih, to ﬁnd
a political solution to the crisis emanating from the Supreme Court’s judge-
ment. The committee recommended that there should be legislative interven-
tion in the form of an enactment by the National Assembly that the natural
resources found offshore be deemed to be found within the territory of the
adjacent littoral state for the purpose of the application of the derivation
principle.136 In itself there is nothing new about legislative intervention after a
rather controversial decision.137 The case of R v. Keyn, for example, resulted in
legislative intervention through the Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act,
1878.138
Further to the committee’s recommendation, the Nigerian President,
Olusegun Obasanjo, sent a Bill to the National Assembly. The purpose of
the Bill, to be cited as the Allocation of Revenue (Abolition of Dichotomy
in the Application of the Principle of Derivation) Act, was to abolish
the onshore/offshore dichotomy created by the Supreme Court decision in
the application of the principle of derivation. The Bill, as originally sent to the
National Assembly provided in section 1(2) that:
‘‘As from the commencement of this Act, the contiguous zone of a State of the
Federation shall be deemed to be part of that State for the purposes of comput-
ing the revenue accruing to the Federation Account from that State pursuant to
the provisions of subsection (2) of section 162 of the Constitution of the Federal
Republic of Nigeria 1999.’’139
In passing the Bill the National Assembly however tinkered with section
1(2) and replaced ‘‘contiguous zone’’ with ‘‘the continental shelf and exclusive
economic zone contiguous’’ to the littoral state. As a result of this amendment,
there was a stalemate between the President who insisted on restricting the
application of the abolition of this dichotomy to the contiguous zone, and the
National Assembly, which took the view that such abolition should extend to
the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone.
Over a year ago the President proposed, as a means to achieve a compro-
mise, to replace ‘‘the contiguous zone’’, as contained in the original Bill, and
the ‘‘continental shelf and economic zone’’ inserted by the National Assembly,
with the phrase ‘‘200-metre water depth isobath’’.140 The President, in his
letter dated 5 February, 2003 to the Senate, purported to be guided by article
decision. See ‘‘Supreme Court Ruling: How Does It Affect the States?’’ THISDAY newspaper,
8 April, 2002.
136 The Committee however felt that a long-term solution to the onshore/offshore issue raised
by the Supreme Court would require constitutional amendment. See Oma Djebah (2002)
‘‘Resource Control: How Long Can Obasanjo Hold Out?’’ http://www.nigerdeltacongress.com/
rarticles/resource_control_how_long_can_ob.htm. Under S.9 of the 1999 Constitution constitu-
tional amendment involves a long and complicated procedure.
137 The National Assembly of Nigeria, consisting of the Senate and the House of Representa-
tives, has the power under s. 4 (2) of the 1999 Constitution to make laws for the peace, order and
good government of the Federation or any part thereof with respect to any matter included in the
Exclusive Legislative List.
138 Marston, above, n. 114, at 138–149.
139 See Oma Djebah and Bature Umar (2002), ‘‘Obasanjo moves against Onshore/Offshore
Dichotomy: Sends abolition bill to N/Assembly’’, http://www.thisdayonline.com/archive/2002/
09/05/20020905news01.html
140 ‘‘Obasanjo proposes new way out of Onshore/Offshore crisis’’, The Nigerian Guardian,
26 February, 2003.
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76 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in making his
compromise proposal.141 However, the 200-metre water depth appears to be a
throwback to the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf in which the
200-metre depth or exploitability criterion was used to describe the continen-
tal shelf.142 The modern law of the sea, as contained in article 76(1) of the
LOSC, utilizes the different criteria of natural prolongation of the land
territory/distance of 200 nautical miles. It is therefore difﬁcult to imagine
why the President, if he purported to be acting in line with article 76, should
have any objections to retaining the term ‘‘continental shelf ’’. To make
doubly sure that this is in line with article 76 of the Convention, the deﬁnition
section of the Act could further provide that the term ‘‘continental shelf ’’ as
contained in the Act should be as deﬁned in ‘‘the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea 1982 or as from time to time deﬁned by any subsequent
Convention binding on Nigeria.’’143
After much disagreement between the executive and the legislative arm, the
latter has accepted the compromise proposal of the President. On 9 January,
2004, the President presented the Bill, which was approved and passed by
the Senate and the House of Representatives on 20 January, 2004 and
10 February, 2004 respectively.144
CONCLUSION
The legislative intervention initiative in the form of the Allocation of
Revenue (Abolition of Dichotomy in the Application of the Principle of
Derivation) Act, 2004 is a step in the right direction to rectify an obviously
ﬂawed decision of the Supreme Court. However, the demarcation of the
relevant maritime zones, for the purposes of the derivation formula, cannot
be arbitrary but must be based on established principles of public interna-
tional law. The derivation principle should be extended to the continental
shelf of Nigeria as deﬁned by article 76 of the 1982 Law of the Sea Conven-
tion, a treaty that has been ratiﬁed by Nigeria. Anything less will be mere
political expediency that will derogate from the whole essence of a legislative
intervention to achieve an equitable outcome based on well-established rules
of public international law as to the nature of the offshore zones. A resort to
the 200-metres water depth isobath is a reversion to the depth and exploit-
ability deﬁnition of the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention which appears
anachronistic, especially in the light of Nigeria’s ratiﬁcation of the 1982
Convention.
141 Ibid.
142 See art. 1 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf (1958) 53 A.J.I.L.
858–862.
143 See, e.g., Mauritius’ Maritime Zones Act No. 13 of 1977; Ghana’s Maritime Zones
(Delimitation) Law 1986; Namibia’s Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone Act No. 3 of
1990 and South Africa’s Maritime Zones Act No. 15 of 1994.
144 Kola Ologbondiyan, ‘‘Senate Passes Onshore/Offshore Bill’’, THISDAY newspaper,
21 January, 2004. See Schedule to the Allocation of Revenue (Abolition of Dichotomy in the
Application of the Principle of Derivation) Act, 2004.
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